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ABSTRACT 




The last decade has witnessed a dramatic growth in passive investing via exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs). To the extent that the demand for stocks via ETF flows is not related to firm-specific 
fundamental values, large ETF flows may push the price of the underlying stocks away from their 
fundamentals-based value. In this study I provide evidence consistent with this conjecture. In 
particular, I first document a positive association between ETF flows and the price-to-
fundamentals relation of underlying stocks. Then, by using BlackRock’s expansion into the ETF 
business as an exogenous shock, I provide evidence that the association is likely to be causal rather 
than reflect some form of endogeneity (i.e., ETFs selecting certain stocks). Also, I find that high-
flow firms subsequently underperform low-flow firms in operating and stock performance, 
consistent with the misvaluation being caused by non-fundamental demand shocks. Cross-
sectional tests suggest that the ETF-related misvaluation is stronger for stocks with: a less 
competitive equity market (i.e., with prices more sensitive to demand shocks), lower ownership 
by active investors, and more costly arbitrage constraints. Finally, I find that high-flow firms 
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The efficient market hypothesis and modern portfolio theory have laid the foundations for 
index investing and implied that investors should buy well-diversified portfolios with low fees. 
However, these theories are silent about the impact of index investing on stock pricing. This study 
fills this gap by examining whether exchange-traded fund (ETF) flows induce stock misvaluation 
by pushing the price of the underlying stocks away from their fundamentals-based value. 
The creation of ETFs represents one of the most important financial innovations in recent 
years. ETFs possess many of the characteristics of what Rubinstein (1989) calls an “ideal market 
basket vehicle.” For example, ETFs provide investors with continuous access to diversified 
portfolios and with tax benefits.1 As a result, they have exhibited extraordinary growth over the 
past decade. From 2007 to 2017, the assets under management by ETFs grew from $608 billion to 
$3.4 trillion (Investment Company Institute 2018) and are expected to reach $5 trillion by 2020 
(PwC 2015). Currently, roughly 30% of U.S. equity trading volume is attributable to ETFs.  
The rapid growth in ETFs has raised concerns among policy-makers and practitioners 
about their pricing impact (see Appendix 1). Textbook theories suggest that in complete and 
frictionless markets, basket securities such as ETFs are redundant assets with no impact on the 
prices of the underlying securities. However, ETF flows are mechanically invested in the 
underlying stocks in proportion to their weights in the index that the ETF replicates.2 This implies 
that demand for stocks via ETF flows is not related to firm-specific fundamental values. If 
individual stocks have downward-sloping demand curves (e.g., Shleifer 1986; Kaul et al. 2000; 
                                                          
1 ETF shares are created or redeemed “in kind” – that is, to exchange ETF shares for a basket of securities rather than 
cash. This allows the ETF to avoid selling securities to raise cash to meet redemptions and prevents capital gain 
distributions. Therefore, ETFs are more tax-efficient than traditional mutual funds. 
2 In my sample 60% of ETFs use market-capitalization weights. Others use price-weighted or equal-weighted schemes. 
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Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002), then large ETF flows may induce non-fundamental demand 
shocks, causing prices to decouple from fundamental values.3 Thus, whether and how ETF flows 
affect the price relative to the fundamental value of the underlying stocks is an empirical question. 
To address this question, I start by examining the association between ETF flows and two 
measures of the price-to-fundamentals relation for the underlying stocks. The first one is the value-
to-price ratio (V/P) ratio, which is the ratio of “intrinsic value” (V) to market price (P) (e.g., Lee 
and Swaminathan 1999; Frankel and Lee 1998; Bradshaw 2004). V is a forward-looking measure 
of the fundamental value derived from the residual income valuation model. Intuitively, a lower 
V/P ratio indicates that the market price is high relative to the fundamental value. The second one 
is the “relative growth” ratio, which I define as the ratio between the growth rate implied by the 
fundamentals (operationalized as the growth rate in residual income implied by analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts) and the growth rate implied by the stock price (i.e., the growth rate 
that reconciles the residual income model to the market price, hereinafter the “price-implied 
growth rate” (Penman 2011)). Intuitively, a lower relative growth ratio suggests that the growth 
rate expected by the market is high compared to the growth rate based on the firm’s fundamentals 
(as reflected in analysts’ forecasts).4 Thus, for both measures a lower value suggests high market 
price or market growth expectation relative to the fundamentals-based value or growth. 
Using ETF flow data from 2002 to 2016 from Bloomberg, I find negative associations 
between ETF flows (during a given year) and both V/P and relative growth ratios (measured at the 
                                                          
3 As explained in more details in Section 2.1, if the ETF price deviates from the NAV of the portfolio holdings because 
of a demand shock, authorized participants and other arbitrageurs trade the underlying securities in the same direction 
as the initial shock to the ETF. Therefore, the shocks that occur in the ETF market can be transmitted to the underlying 
stocks.  
4 The value-to-price ratio is perhaps a more direct measure of the price-to-fundamentals relations, but it requires some 
assumptions about the terminal value (see Section 3.3 for details). Hence, I also examine the relative growth ratio, 
which does not require those assumptions. 
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end of the same year), after controlling for firm-level determinants of price-to-fundamental ratios 
(e.g., operating performance, risk measures) and firm fixed effects. Specifically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in ETF flows is associated with an 8.2%-standard-deviation decrease in V/P 
and a 5.0%-standard-deviation decrease in relative growth, equivalent to shifting the median stock 
from the 50th percentile to the 42nd and 45th percentiles of the ratios’ distributions, respectively.  
This association per se is not evidence of a causal impact of ETF flows on the price-to-
fundamentals relation and may be the result of various forms of endogeneity. For example, it may 
reflect a selection effect. If ETF fund managers create ETFs that tend to cover glamour industries 
or include stocks that have recently performed well, there may be a spurious correlation between 
ETF flows and the price-to-fundamentals relation. However, my findings are robust to adding 
industry-year fixed effects and to excluding ETF flows during the first year after an ETF is created. 
More importantly, to address endogeneity concerns, I exploit BlackRock’s expansion into the ETF 
business via its acquisition of BGI (Barclays Global Investors) and its iShares ETF unit in 2009. 
The acquisition was driven by BlackRock’s desire to expand into the ETF business and Barclays’s 
desire to raise funds to avoid a possible future bailout by the UK government (Massa et al. 2016; 
Azar et al. 2018). As a result of the acquisition, iShares ETFs experienced a significant increase in 
inflows (relative to ETFs not belonging to iShares), due to BlackRock’s ability to utilize its 
extensive resources (e.g., salesforce, branding and scale benefits, and strong relationships within 
the distribution channels). This setting generates exogeneous variation in ETF flows because the 
acquisition was not driven by the fundamental characteristics of the stocks with a larger fraction 
of shares held by iShares (the treated sample) but did increase the ETF flows for these stocks, 
compared with stocks with a smaller fraction of shares held by iShares (the control sample).  
4 
 
Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, I find a statistically significant 
decrease in the V/P and relative growth ratios for treated stocks relative to control stocks following 
the acquisition. 5  To the extent that the iShares acquisition was indeed an exogenous shock 
(exogenous relative to the portfolio stocks’ fundamental characteristics), this analysis supports a 
causal explanation for the association between ETF flows and the price-to-fundamentals relation 
documented in my main tests.  
A causal effect of ETF flows on the price-to-fundamentals relation is consistent with non-
fundamental demand shocks pushing prices away from fundamental values, but may also reflect 
other mechanisms. In particular, it is possible that ETF flows impound fundamental information 
better or more promptly than the inputs in the residual income model do. For example, firms with 
high ETF flows (hereinafter high-flow firms) might have superior expected future performance, 
which earnings forecasts in the residual income model fail to fully incorporate. In other words, the 
estimated V for high-flow firms may understate the true V and the estimated implied growth may 
overstate the true market growth expectation, and thus artificially induce the documented low V/P 
and relative growth ratios. However, I find that ETF flows are negatively associated with 
subsequent firm operating performance, sales growth, and stock returns. In particular, a one-
standard-deviation increase in ETF flows is associated with a 3.7% decrease in subsequent annual 
returns. The negative association provides further support for a non-fundamentals-based 
explanation, since non-fundamental demand shocks should subsequently revert. Along the same 
lines, high-flow firms may be associated with lower risk, which may not be properly captured by 
the discount rate in the residual income model (thus, again, the estimated V for high-flow firms 
                                                          
5 In a series of placebo tests, I find no differential changes in V/P and relative growth between treatment and control 
firms from 2005 to 2008, providing support for the parallel trend assumption underlying the DiD research design. 
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may understate the true V and the estimated implied growth for high-flow firms may overstate the 
true market growth expectation and thus artificially induce the documented low V/P and relative 
growth ratios).6 However, I find no difference in the cost of capital calculated from the Fama-
French (2015) five-factor model of high-flow vs. low-flow firms. Also, I control for the Fama-
French (2015) five-factor loadings in all the regressions. 
Overall, the above analyses suggest that (i) the positive association between ETF flows and 
the price-to-fundamentals relation is consistent with a causality interpretation (rather than being 
driven by a selection effect or other forms of endogeneity); (ii) the mechanism underlying this 
causal effect is a non-fundamental-driven demand shock.  
Next, I conduct a series of cross-sectional tests based on three predictions.  First, if a stock 
has a perfectly competitive equity market, then investors are price-takers, and the demand curve 
for the stock should be horizontal with stock prices immune to demand shocks (Shleifer 1986). 
Thus, I expect stronger ETF-related misvaluation for stocks with less competitive equity markets, 
as proxied by the number of shareholders (Armstrong et al. 2010). Second, I expect a stronger 
ETF-related misvaluation in stocks with lower ownership by sophisticated “active” investors 
(identified as in Cremers and Petajusto (2009)), i.e., investors that could eliminate this 
misvaluation. Third, I predict stronger ETF-related misvaluation in stocks without close substitutes 
(proxied by stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, Mashruwala et al. (2006)) and stocks with 
higher short-selling costs (proxied by stocks with fewer shares held by lendable ETFs), since in 
these cases arbitrage is more costly and thus the ETF-related misvaluation should be higher. My 
cross-sectional analyses find support for all three predictions. 
                                                          
6 This may happen under a number of scenarios. For example, ETF inflows may increase investors’ attention, which 
could result in lower cost of capital (Merton 1987). However, I find a negative association between ETF flows and 
investors’ conference call participation (a proxy for investors’ attention) (see Section 5.2 for details). 
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Finally, I examine whether high-flow firms exhibit the behavior typically associated with 
perceived overvaluation, i.e., greater equity issuance, less repurchases, and more insider sales 
(Baker and Wurgler 2002; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Khan et al. 2012).  Indeed, I find that high-
flow firms are more likely to issue secondary equity offerings (SEOs), tend to repurchase fewer 
shares, and have greater insider share sales. I also examine disclosure policies and find that high-
flow firms reduce the amount of earnings forecasts, while low-flow firms increase the amount of 
positive earnings forecasts. One interpretation is that high-flow firms remain silent in an attempt 
to maintain the optimistic valuation, while low-flow firms increase the positive voluntary 
disclosure activity to correct the pessimistic valuation. Overall, these analyses indirectly confirm 
that my price-to-fundamentals measures do indeed capture stock overvaluation. They also suggest 
that ETF-driven misvaluation may have real effects on firms’ policies.  
This study contributes to a nascent line of literature on exchange-traded products 
(Madhavan 2016; Lettau and Madhavan 2018), on which the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has called for more research (Piwowar 2017).7 Prior studies have examined the effects of 
ETF ownership on co-movement of the underlying securities (Da and Shive 2015), the volatility 
of the underlying securities (Ben-David et al. 2017a), and the extent to which prices incorporate 
earnings information (Israeli et al. 2017; Glosten et al. 2018). Other studies focus on the role ETFs 
play in transferring industry information impounded in earnings news (Bhojraj et al. 2018). I 
contribute to this research by documenting another important consequence from a valuation 
perspective: an increase in ETF flows might push the stock price away from the fundamentals-
based value. The results highlight a tension between the benefit of “completing” markets and the 
                                                          
7 A speech by the SEC commissioner Michael Piwowar in September 2017 points out that the effects of exchange 




cost of a loss of fundamental information in stock prices due to the financial innovation. Such a 
loss of fundamental information might undermine efficient resource allocation and reduce 
managerial learning from prices (Baker et al. 2003; Chen et al. 2006).8  
Another important implication of my findings is that ETF investors who are passive in 
nature may unintentionally end up holding overvalued stocks. In turn, this also suggests that 
passive investors might create a market for active investors (Johnson 2016), who should thus 
continue to focus on fundamentals and “buy value rather than prospects or popularity” (Graham 
1963), in contrast to the recent shift of active management toward more index-like investing (see 
the AFA presidential address by Stambaugh (2014)). Relatedly, the SEC might consider further 
relaxing short-sale constraints to mitigate the overvaluation. Some ETFs lend out shares which 
could reduce the short-sale cost. Thus, the SEC might consider encouraging ETFs to lend out more 
shares. 
Lastly, my paper contributes to the understanding of firms’ strategic responses to perceived 
ETF-related overvaluation. In a similar vein, a recent literature documents that passive investors 
can affect firm policies and governance through their voting power (e.g., Appel et al. 2016). My 
paper suggests that ETF investors might have real effects on firms’ policies indirectly through their 
unintended changes in stock prices via the flows into ETFs.  
2. Institutional Details and Literature Review 
2.1 Institutional Details 
ETFs provide investors with the exposure to the broad market, sectors or geographical 
regions, or specific rule-based investment strategies. ETFs are passively managed in that they leave 
                                                          
8 Although premature, one may consider a situation in which during market downturns, appreciation that was driven 
by the ETF buying is likely to eventually turn out to be rotational. This might pose threats to the financial stability 
(Anadu et al. 2018). 
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the selection and the weighting of stocks in the portfolios to the indexes.9  The closet substitute to 
ETFs are open-ended index mutual funds. Unlike index mutual funds, which can only be bought 
or sold at the end of the day at net asset value (NAV), ETFs are traded throughout the day at 
market-determined prices.  
In addition to continuous access to diversified portfolios, ETFs offer low-fees and tax 
advantages relative to mutual funds.10 Many ETFs lend out shares to short-sellers. They also 
provide investors with access to stocks that were previously difficult to trade.11 In particular, the 
ability to exit a position at any time, rather than having to wait until the end of the day, makes the 
risk management of a bet much easier. These benefits have attracted an increasing demand from 
both institutional and individual investors. 
Figure 1 presents the ownership by ETFs, index mutual funds, and non-index mutual funds 
for common stocks each year from 2002 to 2017.12 The average fraction of a stock’s shares held 
by ETFs has risen from 1.45% in 2002 to 6.81% in 2017. The growth of ETFs appears more drastic 
when compared to non-index mutual funds and index mutual funds. Index fund average stock 
ownership was more stable in the sample. Non-index mutual fund average stock ownership, 
although higher than ETFs, has experienced a decline starting from 2007.   
                                                          
9 2% of ETFs are actively-managed. I exclude them from my sample. 
10 On average, the ETF structure enables lower fees than traditional mutual funds, as mutual funds may charge fees 
(such as 12b-1 fees) that ETFs do not charge. 
11 For example, a small-cap ETF, VB, is based on small stocks. However, VB holds close to $21.6 billion net assets 
as of December 2017 and trades at low costs. 
12 I identify a fund as an index fund if its fund name includes a string that identifies it as an index fund or if the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database classifies the fund as an index fund. Specifically, I use the same strings as in Appel et al. (2016) 
to identify index funds. These strings include: Index, Idx, Indx, Ind_(where_ indicates a space), Russell, S & P, S and 
P, SandP, SP, DOW, Dow, DJ, MSCI, Bloomberg, KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, STOXX, FTSE, Wilshire, Morningstar, 




The increasing demand for ETF shares can migrate to the underlying stocks because ETFs 
and the basket securities are tied by arbitrage both on the primary and secondary markets. On the 
primary market, authorized participants (APs), who are large broker-dealers, create or redeem ETF 
shares to ensure that intraday prices of the ETF approximate the NAV of the underlying assets. 
The unique creation/redemption mechanism ensures that ETF shares outstanding expand or 
contract based on investors’ excess demand. Figure 2 uses the creation of ETF shares to illustrate 
the mechanism. With inflows into an ETF (step 1), the AP short sells the ETF shares to meet 
investors’ demand and buys the underlying securities to hedge the short position (step 2), putting 
upward pressure on the underlying securities. At the end of the day, the AP transfers the basket of 
the securities to the ETF sponsor (step 3), and the ETF sponsor creates new ETF shares to cover 
the AP’s short position (step 4). A similar process happens if the AP redeems ETF shares with 
outflows from the ETF.   
On the secondary market, with an increase in investors’ demand in ETF shares, arbitrageurs 
like hedge funds can directly short the ETF and long the underlying securities. Moreover, 
arbitrageurs can impound the demand shock indirectly. For example, hedge funds can short sell an 
overpriced stock and hedge the industry risk by going long in the corresponding sector ETFs. This 
arbitrage activity can put upward pressure on the ETF price, which might be transferred to the 
underlying securities.  
2.2 Literature Review 
There is a growing recent literature on ETFs (Lettau and Madhavan 2018; Ben-David et al. 
2017b). On the one hand, several studies document negative effects of ETFs. They document a 
negative association between ETF ownership and underlying stocks’ liquidity and a positive 
association between ETF ownership and return co-movement (Hamm 2014; Da and Shive 2016). 
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Ben-David et al. (2017a) find that ETF ownership increases intraday and daily stock volatility 
because of the transmission of liquidity shocks. Brown et al. (2017) document that ETF arbitrage 
activity negatively predicts subsequent monthly returns at the ETF level. However, all of these 
studies focus on shorter horizons than the annual horizon I use in my study. In the long-run, one 
would expect short-term mispricing to be arbitraged away.13 
On the other hand, several early market microstructure studies highlight positive effects of 
ETFs. Theoretical models in Admati and Pflederer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) 
suggest that the liquidity trading in the basket can induce informed traders to trade on private 
information. Consistent with these models, Hasbrouck (2003) documents evidence that ETFs 
contribute to intraday price discovery during March 2000 to May 2000. Yu (2005) finds that a 
substantial amount of information incorporated into stock prices originates in the ETF market from 
July 2002 to September 2002. Compared with these studies, I use not only the longer annual 
horizon, but also the data during the most recent period. This is important given the increasing 
popularity of ETFs since 2000.  
            Two recent papers using a relatively long-time horizon and recent sample periods are 
Glosten et al. (2018) and Israeli et al. (2017). Taken together, they find that an increase in ETF 
ownership is associated with an increase in the extent to which stock prices incorporate concurrent 
quarterly systematic earnings information, but a decrease in the extent to which stock prices 
incorporate future annual earnings information. My study complements these studies by focusing 
                                                          
13 One anonymous investment professional states that his prior belief is that the non-fundamental demand shock 
might exist in the short run, but in the long-term, any mispricing will be arbitraged away by active investors. 
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on a directional prediction of how stock valuation changes with ETF flows and use a broader set 
of fundamentals (not only earnings) for the underlying stocks.14 
This paper is also related to the literature on the effects of fund flows on stock prices (e.g., 
Coval and Stafford 2007; Frazzini and Lamont 2008). While the finding of a price impact is not 
new, I argue that the passive and trading nature of ETFs warrant separate attention. First, while 
non-index mutual fund managers have control over the price impact or their trades, ETF managers 
have almost no discretion in terms of the timing and composition of their trades. Second, ETFs 
allow investors to access the market continuously with high liquidity compared with index mutual 
funds.15 These benefits likely enable ETFs to attract more non-fundamental demand than mutual 
funds. In Section 7.2, I show that ETFs have a much larger impact on the price-to-fundamentals 
relation than index mutual funds and non-index mutual funds.16 
3. Data, Sample, and Variable Construction 
3.1 Data 
I follow Brown et al. (2017) and draw information from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and ETF.com to identify ETFs. Specifically, I download ETF tickers from ETF.com 
and merge them with the CRSP database. From Bloomberg, I obtain daily flows for each ETF 
from 2002 to 2016, which I then aggregate into the monthly level.17 I focus on ETFs that are listed 
                                                          
14 It is important to note that the evidence in the three papers is not necessarily mutually exclusive, as Ben-David et 
al. (2017b) argue: “It is possible that prices more quickly reflect certain pieces of information, and, at the same time, 
also are more impacted by liquidity shocks.” 
15 For example, nowadays a lot of insurance companies invest in ETFs due to their high liquidity. 
16 This paper is also indirectly related to the literature on index inclusion (e.g., Shleifer 1986; Wurgler 2011). The 
trigger for the effect I measure is the extent to which investors buy the entire baskets via ETFs, as opposed to the index 
inclusion. Index membership matters only in defining the stocks that ETFs affect. Also, index inclusion is usually 
associated with increased firm disclosures, analyst following, and news coverage which might increase investors’ 
attention (e.g., Boone and White 2015). However, as Section 5.2 and Section 6.2 suggest, ETF flows appear to be 
negatively associated with investors’ attention and firm disclosure activity. 
17 The daily ETF-level flow is defined as the daily change in ETF shares outstanding multiplied by fund NAV. 
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on U.S. exchanges and whose baskets contain U.S. stocks. I include only “plain vanilla” ETFs that 
engage in full replication for the underlying indexes. I exclude leveraged and inverse-leveraged 
ETFs. I merge the ETF data with quarterly ETF holdings data from Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund 
holding database (S12) by using the MFLINKS tables. My sample includes 445 ETFs in total, 
which is comparable to recent studies (e.g., Ben-David et al. 2017a). 
Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the ETFs used in the paper. On average, 
an ETF attracts $32.843 million inflows per month. 72% of the ETFs lend out shares (lendable 
ETFs). Around 60% of the ETFs use market-capitalization weights and other ETFs use either 
equal-weighted schemes or price-weighted schemes.  
The stock sample includes firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with CRSP 
share codes 10 or 11. Stock return and accounting data are from the intersection of the CRSP and 
Compustat datasets. Analyst earnings forecast data are from I/B/E/S. Fama-French factors are from 
Ken French’s website. I exclude stocks with prices less than $1 to mitigate the market 
microstructure noise. I obtain SEO data from the SDC Platinum database and insider trading data 
from the Thomson Financial Insider database. Management earnings forecasts data are from 
I/B/E/S Guidance database. To alleviate the effects of outliers, I winsorize all continuous variables 
at the 1 and 99 percent levels. My final sample includes 29,590 firm-years with all the financials, 
analyst data, and ETF flows data available. 
3.2 ETF Flow 
For each stock i in month m, I calculate the stock-level ETF flows as the weighted average 
of the flows for all ETFs holding the stock, where the weight is the stock i’s portfolio weight in 
each ETF j. I then aggregate monthly stock-level ETF flows at the annual level, where the flows 
are accumulated for 12 months from 3 months after the last fiscal year-end to 3 months after the 
13 
 
current fiscal year-end. Next, I scale the annual stock-level ETF flows by the annual dollar trading 
volume.  
Specifically, the ETF flows for each stock i during each year t, ETF_Flowi,t, is calculated 
as follows: 
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =








 ,                                                             (1)  
where ETF Flowj,m,t is the dollar amount of flows in ETF j in month m of year t and 
Weighti,j,m,t is the percentage of  stock i in the portfolio of ETF j held in month m of year t  as 
reported by the most recent available fund portfolio weight data in Thomson Reuters.  Volumei,m,t 
is the dollar trading volume of stock i in month m of year t. 18 Table 1 Panel B presents descriptive 
statistics for the common stocks used in the paper. An average stock experiences $16.431 million 
ETF inflows per year during the sample period.  
3.3 V/P Ratio and Relative Growth 
To examine whether ETF flows induce stock misvaluation relative to fundamentals-based 
valuation, I start by examining the associations between ETF flows and two measures of the price-
to-fundamentals relation in the fundamental valuation analysis.  
3.3.1 V/P Ratio 
The first measure is the Value-to-Price (V/P) ratio, which is the ratio of the “intrinsic value” 
(V) to the market price (P) (e.g., Lee et al. 1999; Frankel and Lee 1998; Bradshaw 2004). V is a 
forward-looking measure of the fundamental value derived from the residual income model, and 
the price is measured at the end of 3 months after the fiscal year-end. Intuitively, a lower V/P ratio 
indicates that the market price is high relative to the fundamental value. In particular, the residual 
                                                          
18 To make sure the results are not driven by the denominator, I also use market capitalization as the scale variable. 
The main results are qualitatively similar.  
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income value V is estimated as the sum of book value of equity (B), the present value of expected 
residual income (RI) for the next two years, and a terminal value after the second year:  









 ,                                                              (2) 
where residual income is calculated as: 
𝑅𝐼𝑖, 𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟 × 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟) × 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                   (3) 
that is, the residual income is earnings less a charge against book value to cover the 
investor’s required return. As the proxy for the market earnings expectation, I use the median of 
the first forecasts made by analysts following 3 months after the fiscal year-end to make sure the 
information of financial statements is available to analysts when they form earnings expectations.  
As discussed in Penman (1997), the terminal value computation is crucial to the valuation 
model. Following Lee et al. (1999), I estimate the terminal value under the assumption that the 
abnormal economic profits for each firm fade toward the long-term industry average. Specifically, 
I assume that firm ROE fades toward a target industry average ROE since industry average ROE 
incorporates the degree of accounting conservatism in a given industry.  
In particular, I estimate terminal value by assuming firm ROE linearly fades to the median 
industry ROE for 10 years starting from t+3 to t+12, after which the residual incomes are assumed 
to be a perpetuity. I calculate the median industry ROE as the median ROE for all stocks in the 
same industry according to the Fama-French 48-industry classifications (Fama and French 1997) 
for the past 10 years. 
I estimate the forecasted book value using the clean surplus relation:  
𝐵𝑖, 𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝑘) × 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 × [1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 × (1 − 𝑘)] ,                             (4) 
where k is the dividend payout ratio, which is estimated by dividing actual dividends in the 
most recent fiscal year by earnings. Following Lee et al. (1999), for companies experiencing 
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negative earnings and paying dividends, I divided the dividends paid by (0.06×Total Assets) to 
derive an estimate of the payout ratio. Payout ratios of less than zero or greater than one were 
assigned a value of 0 or 1.  
3.3.2 Relative Growth 
One concern with using the V/P ratio is that the estimate of V relies on the terminal value 
assumption. As an alternative measure, I estimate the “relative growth” ratio, which I define as the 
ratio between the growth rate implied by the fundamentals (operationalized as the growth rate in 
residual income implied by analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts) and the growth rate implied by 
the stock price (i.e., the growth rate that reconciles the residual income model to the market price, 
hereinafter the “price-implied growth rate” (Penman 2011)). Intuitively, a lower relative growth 
ratio suggests that the growth rate expected by the market is high compared to the growth rate 
based on the firm’s fundamentals (as reflected in analysts’ forecasts). 
I calculate the relative growth using a two-stage approach. First, I infer the implied growth 
rate (𝑔_𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡) from the stock price by reverse engineering the growth rates from the residual 
income valuation model:  






 ,                                                                            (5) 






 .                                                                             (6) 
The price-implied growth rate captures the average long-term firm growth rate that the 
market expects. As equation (6) suggests, the higher discount rate r used in the calculation, the 
higher the implied growth rate will be.  







.                                                                                            (7) 
The fundamental-based growth rate captures the average short-term firm growth rate that 
analysts forecast.  
The relative growth is calculated as the ratio of 1 plus the fundamental-based growth rate 




 .                                                                                                   (8) 
A low relative growth indicates that the market has higher expectations for firm growth 
relative to analysts’ forecasts. Thus, for both V/P and relative growth, a lower value suggests a 
high market price or a market growth expectation relative to fundamentals-based value or growth. 
 In calculating the V/P and relative growth measures, I assume a constant discount rate          
r = 10%. As discussed in Section 4.2, the results are similar using discount rates calculated from 
the Fama-French five-factor model (Fama and French 2015).  In the analyses when V/P is used, I 
omit observations with negative V/P. In the analyses where relative growth is used, I omit 
observations with the implied growth rate higher than the discount rate. In Section 4.3, I discuss 
these omitted observations and show that they do not induce bias in my sample. The inferences do 
not change if they are included. 
In panel B of Table 1, the average V/P in the sample period is 0.73. The average is below 
1, perhaps because of the fade-rate assumption. The average price-implied growth rate is 5.62%, 






4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1 ETF Flows and the Price-to-Fundamentals Relation: Portfolio Analysis 
In this section, I examine the association between ETF flows and the price-to-fundamentals 
relation at portfolio levels. I sort firm-year observations into five portfolios on the basis of annual 
ETF flows and report the time-series averages of firm characteristics, V/P, implied growth, and 
relative growth for each portfolio.    
The results are reported in Table 2. In Panel A, I report firm characteristics for stocks in 
each portfolio. In column (1), high-flow stocks (portfolio 5) are insignificantly larger than low-
flow stocks (portfolio 1). In columns (4) and (5), high-flow stocks and low-flow stocks experience 
similar levels of index mutual fund flows, but high-flow stocks experience larger non-index mutual 
fund outflows, although the difference is not statistically significant. In column (6), high-flow 
firms and low-flow firms have a similar cost of capital as calculated from the Fama-French 5-
factor model. In column (7), high-flow firms have lower realized sales growth than low-flow firms. 
As shown in columns (8)-(10), high-flow firms invest less in R&D, SG&A, and capital expenditure 
than low-flow firms. In column (11), high-flow firms have lower analysts’ long-term earnings 
forecasts. Columns (7)-(11) suggest that high-flow firms seem to have lower growth potential.  
Panel B reports the averages of V/P, implied growth, and relative growth for each portfolio, 
assuming a constant discount rate r = 10%. In columns (1) and (2), high-flow stocks have 
statistically significant lower forward E/P and B/P levels than low-flow stocks. In column (3), V/P 
for high-flow stocks and low-flow stocks are 0.660 and 0.804, respectively. Their difference is       
-0.144, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that high-flow stocks have 
higher prices relative to their fundamental values calculated from the residual income model. In 
column (4), the price-implied growth rates for high-flow stocks and low-flow stocks are 6.821% 
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and 4.547%, respectively. The difference is 2.274%, which is significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the market expects higher growth rates for high-flow stocks. In column (5), the 
relative growth for high-flow stocks and low-flow stocks are 1.253 and 1.434, respectively. The 
difference between the two is -0.181, which is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the 
market forecasts higher growth rate relative to analysts’ forecasts for high-flow firms than for low-
flow firms. In contrast, as columns (6)-(8) report, there are no significant differences in V/P, 
implied growth, or relative growth between high-flow stocks and low-flow stocks at the beginning 
of the year.  
In summary, these preliminary portfolio sorting results suggest that high-flow firms have 
lower sales growth, lower analyst long-term growth forecasts, and lower investment levels, but 
they have a higher price-to-fundamentals relation as captured by lower V/P and relative growth.  
4.2 ETF Flows and the Price-to-Fundamentals Relation: Regression Analyses 
 Both V/P and relative growth are noisy estimates of the price-to-fundamentals relation. It 
is possible that the residual income model with analyst forecasts and a constant discount rate does 
not fully account for firm fundamentals and risk. To investigate these potential deficiencies, I 





)𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .          (9) 
To ease interpretation, I follow Ben-David et al. (2017a) to standardize V/P, relative 
growth, and ETF flows by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard 
deviation. The control variables include: (1) fundamental-based ratios to account for potential 
deficiencies by using analyst earnings forecasts: sales growth, operating profit margin, asset 
19 
 
turnover, F-score (Piotroski 2000), and analyst long-term growth forecasts;19 (2) risk measures to 
account for potential deficiencies of using a constant discount rate: market beta and the other 4-
factor loadings from estimating Fama-French five-factor model using daily returns from 3 months 
after the previous fiscal year-end to 3 months after the current fiscal year-end (same period as the 
calculation for stock-level ETF flows); (3) beginning-year firm characteristics to control for 
potential reverse causality: size, book-to-price, past returns of last four quarters, V/P, and relative 
growth. I also include both firm and year fixed effects in all the specifications.  
The goal is to assess how V/P and relative growth are associated with ETF flows after 
controlling for these fundamental ratios and risk measures. In regression equation (9), b1 is the 
variable of interest. A negative b1 suggests a negative association between ETF flows and V/P and 
relative growth.  
The results are reported in Table 3. From columns (1)-(2), I infer that the relation between 
ETF flows and V/P is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (1), without 
control variables, a one-standard-deviation increase in ETF flows is associated with 9.9% of a 
standard deviation decrease in V/P. In column (2), after controlling for fundamental and risk 
measures, the magnitude of the coefficient on ETF flows decreases to 8.2% of a standard deviation, 
which is still statistically significant at the 1% level. From column (1) to column (2), the 
fundamental measures can explain some variation in V/P. For example, operating profit margin 
and F-score are positively associated with V/P, suggesting that these variables are value drivers 
for firms (Piotroski 2000). However, these fundamental and risk measures cannot fully explain the 
negative association between ETF flows and V/P. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-
                                                          
19 F-scores are based on nine financial signals designed to measure the overall improvement or deterioration in 
firms’ financial condition and is a leading indicator of future profitability (Piotroski 2000). 
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standard-deviation increase in ETF flows shifts the V/P of the median stock from the 50th percentile 
to the 42nd percentile of the distribution of V/P.  
From columns (3)-(4), I infer that the relation between ETF flows and relative growth is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (3), without a control variable, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in ETF flows is associated with 6.0% of a standard deviation 
increase in the relative growth measure. In column (4), after controlling for fundamental and risk 
measures, the magnitude of the coefficient on ETF flows is 5.0% of a standard deviation, which is 
still statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard-
deviation increase in ETF flows shifts the relative growth of the median stock from the 50th 
percentile to the 45th percentile of the distribution of relative growth.  
The results in Table 3 indicate that ETF flows are negatively associated with both V/P and 
relative growth ratios, and such associations cannot be fully explained by firm fundamentals and 
risk measures.  
4.3 Cases with Negative V/P or Growth higher than the Discount Rate 
As discussed in Section 3.3, there are firm-year observations with negative V and/or the 
implied growth rate higher than the discount rate. From a valuation perspective, these observations 
are difficult to interpret at best, so they are omitted from the main results in Table 3 (termed 
“omitted sample” hereafter). In this section, I discuss whether including or excluding these 
observations changes the inferences. 
Because it is hard to interpret the two main variables for these observations, I adopt a third 
valuation measure – the value of speculative growth, which is the difference between the price and 
the value based on a no-growth assumption, scaled by the price. It is the value the market is placing 
on the expected growth, captured by price-implied growth rate above, but now applying to all firms. 
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Specifically, the no-growth value is the total of the book value and the value from short-
term earnings forecasts assuming no growth and is calculated as: 






 .                                                             (10) 




 .                                                                     (11) 
Speculative Growth captures the proportion in the stock price unexplained by accounting 
and short-term forecasts. A high value of speculative growth indicates that a large portion of the 
stock price comes from investors’ speculation about firm future growth, instead of anchoring on 
the accounting in the book value and short-term forecasts.  
I first sort observations into five portfolios on the basis of the annual ETF flows for the full 
sample and the omitted sample, respectively, and report the time-series averages of the value of 
speculative growth for each portfolio.     
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4. In both columns (1) and (2), for the full 
sample and the omitted sample, the market is pricing speculative growth for the high-flow firms 
significantly higher than the low-flow firms.  
Next, I examine if the association between ETF flows and value of speculative growth can 
be explained by firm fundamentals and risk measures by estimating the following regression: 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡.       (12) 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. In both columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
on ETF Flow are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that ETF flows are positively 
associated with the speculative portion in prices for both the full sample and the omitted sample. 
The results imply that including or excluding these omitted observations do not change the main 
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inferences – ETF flows are positively associated with price-to-fundamentals relation for 
underlying stocks. 
4.4 Addressing the Endogeneity Concern 
4.4.1 ETF Creations 
This association per se is not evidence of a causal impact of ETF flows on the price-to-
fundamentals relation and may be the result of various forms of endogeneity. In my analysis, I 
isolate the variation in ETF flows unrelated to observables (by controlling firm operating 
performance and risk measures) and cross-sectional differences between firms (by controlling firm 
fixed effects). However, the association may still reflect a selection effect, confounding the 
interpretation of the results.  
One concern is that if sector ETFs cover glamour industries to begin with (e.g., technology 
stocks), then there may be a spurious correlation between ETF flows and the price-to-fundamentals 
relation. To address this, I re-run regression (9) and include industry-year fixed effects in addition 
to firm fixed effects in order to control for time-variant unobservable industry-specific factors that 
may drive the results. I obtain similar results. Specifically, in column (2) and (4) of Table 3, the 
coefficients on ETF Flow become -0.063 and -0.048, respectively, which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (t-stats = -3.75 and -3.76). 
Another concern is that ETF fund managers create ETFs which follow stocks that have 
recently performed well, and these stocks will continue to perform well due to momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Daniel and Moskowitz 2016). In all my regression specifications, I 
control for the past four-quarter returns. To further mitigate this concern, I re-run regression (9) 
and use mature ETF flows instead of total ETF flows, where mature ETF flows are calculated by 
excluding ETF flows during the first year after an ETF is created. In column (2) and (4) of Table 
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3 the coefficients on ETF Flow become -0.070 and -0.049, respectively, which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (t-stats = -4.37 and -4.44).  
In summary, the results are robust to adding industry-year fixed effects and using mature 
ETF flows, suggesting that the negative associations between ETF flows and V/P and relative 
growth cannot be fully explained by a selection effect driven by ETF creations. 
4.4.2 BlackRock’s Expansion into the ETF Business 
More importantly, to address endogeneity concerns, I explore an additional setting – 
BlackRock’s expansion into the ETF business via its acquisition of the iShares ETF family from 
Barclays. 
At the end of 2009, BlackRock acquired BGI (Barclays Global Investors) and its iShares 
unit in order to establish its ETF business.20 Barclays sold BGI to raise funds to strengthen its 
balance sheet, hoping to avoid a possible future bailout by the UK government. The acquisition 
caused BlackRock to increase its asset holdings by 37%, supporting BlackRock’s global leadership 
in ETFs. As a result of the acquisition, iShares ETFs experienced a significant increase in inflows 
(relative to ETFs not belonging to iShares), due to BlackRock’s ability to utilize its extensive 
resources (e.g., salesforce, branding and scale benefits, and strong relationships within the 
distribution channels).21, 22 Figure 3 plots the flows into an average ETF for iShares ETFs and for 
ETFs not belonging to iShares, respectively. Figure 3 suggests that before 2009, an average iShares 
                                                          
20 The acquisition was announced on June 11, 2009 and was completed in December of 2009. Thus, I expect the effects 
of increased ETF inflows to start manifesting itself in stock prices from the beginning of 2010.  
21 For example, the assets under management of iShares increased by 19% from 2009 to 2010 (Blackrock 2010).   
22 During a conference call on June 12, 2009, BlackRock emphasized these points to expand the iShares business. For 
example, Larry Fink, the Chairman of BlackRock talked about the distribution channel with Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch: “…with our relationship with that entity, with our mutual fund platform there we hope that we could use those 




ETF received similar flows to an average non-iShares ETF. However, in 2010, an average iShares 
ETF received more flows than an average non-iShares ETF. This setting generates exogeneous 
variation in ETF flows because the acquisition was not driven by the fundamental characteristics 
of the stocks with a larger fraction of shares held by iShares (the treated sample) but did increase 
the ETF flows for these stocks, compared with stocks with a smaller fraction of shares held by 
iShares (the control sample).  
To verify that treated stocks indeed experience a greater increase in ETF flows compared 
with control stocks, I estimate the following DiD regression:  
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑇𝐹% 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 +
𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                       (13) 
where TREAT equals 1 if the percentage of shares by iShares is above the sample median 
before the acquisition and equals 0 for other stocks.23 POST equals 1 for 2010 and 0 for 2009. 
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the 12-month stock-level ETF flows scaled by total dollar trading 
volume in year 2009 or 2010. To mitigate the concern that the results might be driven by ETFs 
other than iShares ETFs, I also control for Other ETF%, which is the ownership by ETFs not 
belonging to iShares. I also include both firm and year fixed effects in all the specifications. The 
results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. Across two columns, I find consistent results 
that treated stocks experience a greater increase in ETF flows compared with control stocks. The 
economic magnitude seems large. As compared with other stocks, the treated stocks experience 
19.7% of a standard deviation increase in ETF flows following the acquisition.  
                                                          
23 It is identified as the last available weight in Thomson Reuters before the fund management name changed from 
“Barclays Global Fund Advisors" to "BlackRock Fund Advisors."  
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I then adopt the same DiD setting comparing the changes in V/P and relative growth one 




)𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑇𝐹% 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.                                                                                                                              (14) 
The results are reported in column (3) for V/P and column (4) for relative growth in Table 
5. In column (3), compared with control stocks, the treated stocks experience a 4.9% of a standard 
deviation decrease in V/P, with t-statistic of -2.40. In column (4), compared with control stocks, 
the treated stocks experience a 2.4% of a standard deviation decrease in relative growth, with a t-
statistic of -1.91.   
A potential concern is that V/P and relative growth may have evolved differently prior to 
the acquisition, which would violate the parallel trend assumption of the difference-in-differences 
design and make it hard to attribute the changes in V/P and relative growth of treated firms to the 
increased ETF flows following the acquisition. To address this concern, I re-estimate model (14) 
using pseudo-event dates prior to 2009. Specifically, I re-run regression (14) by adjusting the event 
date to 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. In an untabulated analysis, I find that all the 
coefficients on TREAT×POST are statistically insignificant. These results alleviate concerns 
related to a violation of the parallel trend assumption driving my results.  
Another concern is that iShares ETFs may have selected stocks in glamour industries which 
non-ishares ETFs did not cover before the acquisition. In untabulated results, most industries 
(based on the Fama-French’s 48 industry classification) are present in both samples, except for 
“Candy & Soda” and “Tobacco Products,” which are only included in the treated sample, and 
“Defense” which is only included in the control sample. However, the main inference does not 
change if I exclude these firms from the sample. In Column (3) and (4) the coefficients of ETF 
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Flow are -0.048 and -0.023, and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively (t-
stats = -2.36 and -1.83).  
In summary, I find statistically significant decreases in V/P and relative growth for treated 
stocks relative to control stocks following the iShares acquisition. To the extent that the acquisition 
was indeed an exogenous shock (exogenous relative to the portfolio stocks’ fundamental 
characteristics), the association supports a causal interpretation between ETF flows and the price-
to-fundamentals relation documented in my main tests.24  
5. Exploring the Mechanism: Non-fundamental Demand Inducing Misvaluation 
Section 4 suggests that ETF flows increase the price-to-fundamentals relation for 
underlying stocks. The effects of ETF flows are consistent with non-fundamental demand shocks 
pushing prices away from the fundamental values, but might be also consistent with other 
mechanisms. In this section, I explore the alternative mechanisms. 
5.1 ETF Flows and Future Firm Performance  
It is possible that ETF flows impound fundamental information better or more promptly 
than the inputs in the residual income model do. For example, high-flow firms might have superior 
expected future performance or increased future investment levels that analysts fail to fully 
incorporate into their earnings forecasts. In other words, the estimated V for high-flow firms may 
understate the true V and the estimated implied growth may overstate the true market growth 
expectation, and thus artificially induce the documented low V/P and relative growth ratios. 
To investigate this mechanism, I first examine the association between ETF flows and 
subsequent firm performance as captured by operating performance, sales growth, and investments. 
                                                          
24 One caveat with this analysis is the time period immediately followed the financial crisis. To alleviate this concern, 
I re-run regression (14) and define the post period as 2010-2014, and the pre period as 2005-2009, to smooth out the 
effects of the financial crisis. The results are qualitatively similar.  
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Next, relying on the premise that non-fundamental demand shocks subsequently revert, whereas 
fundamental information leads to permanent price changes, I examine the association between 
ETF flows and subsequent stock returns. 
Specifically, I estimate the following regressions: 
𝑅𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                                    (15) 
where 𝑅𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 is the return on net operating assets in the subsequent year, which is calculated 
as operating income divided by net operating assets. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 is the sales growth rate in 
the subsequent year. 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1  is one of the following variables in the subsequent year: 1) 
CAPEX scaled by beginning-year total assets, 2) R&D scaled by beginning-year total assets, 3) 
SG&A scaled by beginning-year total assets. To ease interpretation, I standardize RNOA, Sales 
Growth, INVST and ETF Flow by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard 
deviation. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 is the buy-and-hold stock return during the subsequent year.  
 The results are reported in Table 6. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on ETF Flow 
are negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, suggesting that ETF flows are 
negatively associated with subsequent operating performance and sales growth.25  In columns (3) 
and (4), the coefficients on ETF Flow are insignificant, suggesting that ETF flow are not 
significantly associated with subsequent investments in capital expenditure and R&D. In column 
(5), the coefficient on ETF Flow is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that ETF flows are 
negatively associated with future firm investments in SG&A. More importantly, in column (6), the 
coefficient on ETF Flow is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = -3.7), 
                                                          
25 Due to conservative accounting, if a high-flow firm invest more, it might earn lower RNOA subsequently. However, 
columns (9)-(11) in Table 2 suggest that high-flow firms invest less in R&D, SG&A, and CAPEX.   
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suggesting that ETF flows are negatively associated with subsequent stock returns. A one-
standard-deviation increase in ETF flows is associated with a 3.7% decrease in subsequent annual 
stock returns.  
In summary, this section suggests that an increase in ETF flows is not associated with 
superior future firm performance and investments, and is negatively associated with future stock 
returns. These findings are more consistent with the conjecture that the non-fundamental demand 
driven by ETF flows push prices away from fundamental values than the conjecture that ETF flows 
impound fundamental information more promptly than the inputs in the residual income model do.  
5.2 ETF Flows and Risk 
It is possible that ETF inflows are associated with lower risk. If so, then the constant 
discount rate used in the paper might underestimate the true discount rate and thus the intrinsic 
value V and might overestimate the implied growth rate for high-flow firms. However, as column 
(6) of Panel B in Table 2 suggests, there is no significant difference in the cost of capital calculated 
from the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model of high-flow vs. low-flow firms, and I control for 
the Fama-French (2015) five-factor loadings as risk measures in all the regressions. Nevertheless, 
I re-run regression (9), using the cost of capital calculated from the five-factor model, and find that 
the coefficients on ETF Flow in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 become -0.062 and -0.037, 
respectively, which are still significant at the 1% level (t-stats = -3.82 and -3.64).  
Another possible alternative explanation under the risk hypothesis comes from Merton 
(1987), where increased investors’ attention can reduce the cost of capital. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) 
find empirical evidence consistent with the Merton model. If ETF flows increase investors’ 
attention, then the effect of ETF flows is more driven by increased investors’ attention rather than 
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the non-fundamental demand mechanism. To examine this possibility, I estimate the following 
regression: 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡.                          (16) 
I use investors’ participation during conference calls to capture investors’ attention. More 
specifically, I use the two proxies for attention: (1) #Questions is the total number of questions 
being asked at conference calls during the year and (2) Question Length is the total number of 
words in questions being asked at conference calls during the year. I interpret more questions or 
longer questions during conference calls as higher investors’ attention. I obtain conference call 
transcripts from the Thomson Reuters Street Events database.26 The results are reported in Table 
7. The results suggest that ETF flows are associated with fewer questions and shorter questions 
from investors during conference calls, implying that ETF flows are associated with lower 
investors’ attention. Therefore, it seems less likely that my main results are driven by increased 
investors’ attention with ETF flows. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments and tests, a caveat in interpreting my study is that I 
cannot fully rule out the possibility that ETF flows may affect the price-to-fundamentals relation 
through a risk channel. 
5.3 Cross-sectional Analyses 
I conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to provide indirect evidence on the role of 
ETF flows in stock misvaluation based on three predictions. First, I expect that the demand shocks 
have a stronger effect on stock prices when the stock has an imperfectly competitive equity market. 
If a stock has a perfectly competitive market, investors are price-takers, and the demand curve for 
the stock should be horizontal with stock prices immune to demand shocks (Shleifer 1986). 
                                                          
26 I conduct this analysis for S&P 1500 companies.  
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Therefore, I expect the main results in Table 3 to be stronger for stocks with less perfectly 
competitive equity markets, as proxied by the number of shareholders (Armstrong et al. 2010).  To 




)𝑖,𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑤 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑇𝐹_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏3𝐹𝑒𝑤 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                          (17)                   
where 𝐹𝑒𝑤 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 equals 1 if the number of shareholders is below the median at the beginning of 
year t. A negative b1 suggests that the ETF-related misvaluation is stronger for stocks with less 
perfectly competitive markets. The results are reported in column (1) and column (2) of Table 8. 
The coefficients on ETF_Flow× Few SH are both negative and statistically significant, consistent 
with the conjecture that the ETF-related misvaluation are stronger with less perfectly competitive 
markets.  
Next, I expect sophisticated active investors to exploit and eliminate this misvaluation. To 
proxy for active investors, I use non-index mutual funds with high active shares as calculated by 
Cremers and Petajusto (2009). As Cremers and Petajusto (2009) find, non-index mutual funds with 
higher active shares outperform those with lower active shares in terms of benchmark-adjusted 
returns before and after expenses. Active shares of a fund represent the shares of portfolio holdings 





 ∑ |𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖|
𝑁
𝑖=1  ,                                                                   (18) 
where 𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖 are the portfolio weights of stock i in the fund and in the index, and the 
sum is taken over all stocks. I define non-index funds with at least 60% Active Share as active 
investors and other non-index funds as closet indexers, since Cremers and Petajisto suggest that 
level as a rough break-point for closet indexing. I conjecture that stocks with lower ownership by 
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active investors (i.e., higher ownership by closet indexers) at the beginning of the year exhibit a 
stronger ETF-related misvaluation. To test this conjecture, I estimate the following regression 
equation:            
𝑉
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑇𝐹_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏3𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                         (19)                   
where 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  equals 1 if ownership by active investors is below the median at the 
beginning of year t. The results are reported in Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 8. The 
coefficients on ETF Flow×Low Active are both negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that the ETF-related misvaluation is stronger with less activity by active investors. 
Third, I predict ETF-related misvaluation to be stronger when it is more costly for 
arbitrageurs, as captured by: 1) lack of close substitutes and 2) short-selling costs. First, in a 
riskless hedge, the residual variance of returns to the zero-investment hedge after netting out the 
long and short position is zero (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2000). The arbitrageur reduces the 
residual variance of returns in the hedge portfolio if he can find close substitute stocks to the stocks 
subject to ETF-related misvaluation.  Therefore, I conjecture the ETF-related misvaluation to be 
stronger for stocks without close substitutes. Following Mashruwala et al. (2006), I use 
idiosyncratic volatility to capture whether a stock is likely to have close substitutes. Second, with 
more shares owned by lendable ETFs, the number of shares of underlying stocks available for 
shorting goes up, possibly reducing the cost of shorting those shares (Glosten et al., 2018), which 
might reduce the overvaluation. Therefore, I conjecture the ETF-related overvaluation to be 
stronger for stocks with fewer shares held by lendable ETFs. To test these conjectures, I estimate 





𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑇𝐹_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                         (20)   
𝑉
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑇𝐹_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏3𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                         (21)   
where 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡  equals 1 if idiosyncratic return volatility is above the median and 
idiosyncratic return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of residuals from a market 
model (with value-weighted CRSP index) that uses 252 daily returns during year t-1. 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  equals 1 if ownership by lendable ETFs is below the median. The results are 
reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 8. In column (5) and column (6), the coefficients on ETF 
Flow× High IVOL are negative and significant at the 5% level. In column (7) and column (8), the 
coefficients on ETF Flow× Low Lend are negative and significant at the 5% level. These results 
are consistent with the conjecture that the ETF-related misvaluation is stronger for stocks without 
close substitutes or with high short-selling costs.  
6. Indirect Evidence on ETF-related Misvaluation: Firm Policies 
Finally, I examine whether high-flow firms exhibit behavior typically associated with 
perceived overvaluation.  
6.1 Share Issuances/Repurchases 
Baker (2009) suggests that firms supply more shares as a response to non-fundamental 
investor demand. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that firms take advantage of mispricing 
by issuing equity when it is overpriced and buying it back when it is undervalued. If ETF flows 
induce stock misvaluation, then I expect that high-flow firms are more likely to issue seasoned 
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equity offers (SEOs) and/or repurchase fewer shares than low-flow firms. Relatedly, I expect high-
flow firms have greater insider sales. To test these conjectures, I estimate the following regressions: 
𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                        (22)     
where 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 equals one if the firm has an SEO during the subsequent year and zero otherwise. 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1  equals the total amount of share repurchases after removing the 
effects of share issuances (Fama and French 2001; Skinner 2008) and potential repurchases for 
exercised options (Ferri and Li 2018), scaled by beginning-year total assets.27 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1is 
the ratio of shares sold to the sum of shares sold and purchased by all insiders during the subsequent 
year (Khan et al. 2012; Priotroski and Roulstone 2005). To ease interpretation, I standardize 
Adjusted Repurchases, Insider Sales, and ETF Flow by subtracting the sample mean and dividing 
by the sample standard deviation. 
The results are reported in the Panel A of Table 9. In column (1), the coefficient on ETF 
Flow is positive and significant at the 10% level (t-stat = 1.85), consistent with the conjecture that 
with high ETF flows, firms are more likely to issue SEOs during the next year. In column (2), the 
coefficient on ETF Flow is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-stat = - 1.89), consistent 
with the notion that with high ETF inflows, firms repurchase fewer shares during the next year. In 
column (3), the coefficient on ETF Flow is positive and significant at 1% level (t-stat = 2.99), 
consistent with the conjecture that firm insiders subsequently sell more shares following an 
increase in ETF flows. These results suggest that when investors indirectly buy more stock shares 
                                                          
27 The repurchase after removing the effect of share issuances is calculated as follows: if the firm uses the treasury 
stock method for repurchase, then it equals the increase in common treasury stock. If the firm uses the retirement 
method, then it equals total repurchases minus stock issuance and change in preferred stock redemption value.  The 
effect of repurchasing exercised options equals the product between the number of options exercised and average 
stock price during the year. The number of option exercised data is available on Compustat starting from 2004. 
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of a specific firm (via ETF flows), the firm is more likely to issue SEOs, tends to repurchase fewer 
shares, and has greater insider sales. 
6.2 Firm Disclosures 
If ETF flows induce misvaluation, then I expect firms’ disclosures to vary with ETF flows. 
For example, high-flow firms may reduce voluntary disclosures about their future earnings and 
remain silent in an attempt to maintain the optimistic valuation and low-flow firms may increase 
voluntary disclosures in an attempt to correct the pessimistic outlook (Bergman and 
Roychowdhury 2008). Following Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), I focus on long-horizon 
earnings forecasts, since over short horizons, disclosure policy is greatly affected by the 
disciplining effect of earnings announcements. 
To test these conjectures, I estimate the following regression: 
#𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                                    (23) 
where #𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1  is the number of long-horizon management earnings forecasts issued 
during the subsequent year. #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1  and #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 are the numbers of long-
horizon, walk-up and walk-down earnings forecasts issued during the subsequent year, 
respectively. A long-horizon forecast is one made at least 90 days before the forecast period end 
date, and a walk-up or walk-down forecast is one that is higher or lower than the consensus 
estimate, respectively. To ease interpretation, I standardize #Guidance, #WalkUp, #WalkDown, 
and ETF Flow by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. 
The results are reported in the Panel B of Table 9. In column (1), the coefficient on ETF 
Flow is negative and significant at 1% level (t-stat = -2.59), suggesting a negative association 
between ETF flows and firm disclosures. Columns (2) and (3) suggest that the negative association 
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between ETF flows and number of forecasts are driven by walk-up forecasts. The results imply 
that firm voluntary disclosures depend on ETF flows in a way that seems consistent with ETF 
flows inducing misvaluation, as high-flow firms reduce the amount of voluntary disclosures and 
low-flow firms increase the amount of positive voluntary disclosures. I interpret these results as 
high-flow firms remaining silent in an attempt to maintain the optimistic valuation and low-flow 
firms increasing the amount of voluntary disclosures in an attempt to correct the pessimistic 
valuation.  
Overall, the results in Section 6.1 and 6.2 provide indirect support for the notion that the 
price-to-fundamentals measures do indeed capture stock misvaluation. They also suggest that 
ETF-driven misvaluation may have real effects on firm policies. 
7 Additional Analyses 
7.1 Cross-section of Stock Returns 
If high-flow stocks are overvalued, then active investors should be able to form trading 
strategies to exploit the misvaluation. To test this conjecture, at the beginning of every calendar 
month, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the last available 12-month ETF flows. In 
Table 10, I report the monthly weighted-average portfolio raw returns in column (1) and Fama-
French five-factor alphas in column (2). I also report the zero-cost portfolio returns from buying 
the top 20% stocks and shorting the lowest 20% stocks. The results indicate that stocks with high-
ETF flows underperform low-flow stocks by around -0.7% per month, consistent with the 
conjecture that active investors could potentially earn abnormal profits by trading against high 





7.2 Mutual Fund Flows 
In this section, I include non-index mutual fund flows and index mutual fund flows in the 
regression (9) to alleviate the concern that the effects of ETF flows are associated with and might 
be subsumed by the traditional mutual fund flows. Non-index and index mutual fund flows at the 
fund level are calculated as:  
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑀𝐹𝑗, 𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑀𝐹𝑗, 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗, 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 × (1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑡),                                        (24) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 is total net assets and 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the fund return during quarter t. Since mutual fund flows 
are not directly observable, I follow prior literature to infer flows by assuming that inflows and 
outflows occur at the end of the quarter and that existing investors reinvest dividends and other 
distributions in the fund (Zheng 1999). I then calculate the stock-level mutual fund flows in the 
same way as I calculate the stock-level ETF flows and re-run the main regression (9). The results 
are reported in Table 11. Non-index mutual fund flows have no significant effects on V/P and 
relative growth, perhaps because some non-index mutual funds are skilled in picking stocks with 
strong fundamental values (higher V) and they have control over the price impact of their trades as 
described in Section 2.2. Compared with index mutual fund flows, ETF flows have much larger 
effects on V/P and relative growth, perhaps because ETFs impose larger non-fundamental demand 
on stock shares. These results suggest that the effects of ETF flows are not subsumed by mutual 
fund flows and, in fact, have larger effects on the price-to-fundamentals relation for underlying 
stocks. 
8. Conclusion 
The tremendous growth of ETFs can be explained by the fact that they offer investors 
continuous access to diversified and inexpensive investment vehicles. However, ETFs may also 
attract non-fundamental demand, which is passed on to the underlying stocks. This mechanism can 
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push stock prices away from fundamental values, inducing stock misvaluation. Consistent with 
this conjecture, I find ETF flows are positively associated with the price-to-fundamentals relation 
for underlying stocks. To investigate whether these documented effects of ETF flows are causal, I 
use BlackRock’s expansion into the ETF business as an exogenous shock supporting the causal 
interpretation of the results. High-flow firms tend to underperform low-flow firms in operating 
performance, sales growth, investment levels, and stocks returns during the subsequent year, which 
is consistent with non-fundamental demand shocks inducing misvaluation. Further supporting this 
view, I show that the effects of ETFs are stronger in stocks with: a less competitive market (i.e., 
with prices more sensitive to demand shocks), lower ownership by active investors, and more 
costly arbitrage constraints (i.e., stock where misvaluation is less likely to be corrected). Lastly, I 
find high-flow firms exhibit behavior typically associated with perceived overvaluation, i.e., 
greater equity issuances, less repurchases, and greater insider sales. 
In addition to contributing to research on index investing and the literature on ETFs, my 
study highlights the importance of focusing on firm fundamentals particularly with the increase in 
passive investments in current financial markets. Regulators might consider further relaxing short-













Figure 1 ETF Ownership Trend 
Figure 1 exhibits the time trend for stock ownership by ETFs, index mutual funds, and non-index mutual funds, respectively. For each year, I average the 
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Figure 2 ETF Creation/Redemption Mechanism 
This figure exhibits the creation of ETF shares. When there is a large inflow into ETF shares (step 1), the AP short sells the ETF shares to meet investors’ demand 
and buys the underlying securities to hedge the short position (step 2), putting upward pressure on the underlying securities. At the end of the day, the AP transfers 
the basket of the securities to the ETF sponsor (step 3), and the ETF sponsor creates new ETF shares to cover the AP’s short position (step 4). A similar process 
















Figure 3 ETF Flows for iShares and Other ETFs 
This figure exhibits ETF flows for iShares ETFs and ETFs not belonging to iShares (non-iShares) from 2005 to 2010. For each year, I average the annual ETF 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the ETF characteristics and stocks characteristics in my sample. 
The sample spans from 2002 to 2016.  
Panel A ETF Characteristics 
  p25 Median p75 Mean Std.dev 
Monthly Flow (Million) -8.255 3.886 32.552 32.843 537.277 
ETF Market Cap (Million) 83.879 346.084 1,645.253 3,067.940 10,977.583 
Monthly Turnover 0.115 0.211 0.479 0.712 6.835 
Net Asset Value (Million) 24.565 40.856 62.615 49.381 34.462 
Securities Lending Indicator 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.719 0.450 
Market-Cap Weight Indicator 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.597 0.491 
 
Panel B Stock Characteristics 
  p25 Median p75  Mean  Std.dev  
Market Cap (Million) 318.299 943.018 3,053.086 4,735.040 12,625.420 
Book-to-Price 0.311 0.495 0.746 0.582 0.400 
ETF Flows (Million) 0.157 2.197 9.155 16.431 32.812 
Index Mutual Fund Flows (Million) -0.001 0.052 2.898 8.394 28.873 
Non-index Mutual Fund Flows 
(Million) 
-0.871 -0.004 0.329 -3.969 37.414 
ETF Flows*100/$Volume  0.017 0.068 0.165 0.114 0.152 
ETF Ownership 0.818% 2.448% 5.925% 4.589% 7.552% 
V/P 0.340 0.578 0.877 0.730 0.732 
Price-implied Growth Rate 3.565% 6.185% 7.408% 5.620% 10.240% 
Relative Growth 1.005 1.112 1.408 1.360 1.352 
Speculative Growth 0.111 0.396 0.640 0.300 0.516 
Analyst LT Forecast 10.000% 13.000% 17.500% 14.293% 9.171% 
F-Score 5.000 6.000 7.000 5.626 1.551 
Sales Growth -0.990% 7.550% 18.542% 10.851% 22.769% 
Operating Profit Margin 1.380% 7.893% 13.572% 5.379% 18.215% 
Asset Turnover 0.643 1.493 2.687 1.949 3.446 
Annual Return -0.140 0.089 0.326 0.122 0.426 
RNOA -0.027 0.079 0.185 0.100 0.769 
#Shareholder (Thousand) 0.290 1.570 7.500 11.360 7.500 
Ownership by mutual funds with active 
share>=60% 0.000% 0.011% 5.579% 4.317% 8.700% 
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) 1.400% 1.976% 2.737% 2.198% 1.061% 
Lendable ETF% 0.000% 0.900% 3.961% 2.319% 2.978% 
SEO Indicator 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.292 
Insider Sales 0.000 0.608 0.994 0.366 0.460 
Adjusted Repurchases 0.000% 0.000% 0.714% 1.629% 4.760% 
#Guidance 0.000 0.000 3.000 1.350 2.252 
#WalkUp 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.502 1.012 






Table 2 ETF Flows and the Price-to-Fundamentals Relation: Portfolio Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results for portfolio analysis. Monthly stock-level ETF flows are calculated as the weighted average of the flows for all ETFs holding the stock, 
where the weight is the stock’s portfolio weight in each ETF. Each year, all the firms are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of the annual ETF flows, which are 
calculated by adding up monthly stock-level ETF flows for 12 months from 3 months after the previous fiscal year-end, scaled by the total dollar trading volume 
during the year. Time-series averages of firm characteristics, V/P, and relative growth measures (assuming a constant discount rate 10%) for each portfolio are 
reported. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A ETF Flows and Firm Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 



























1-Low 4,214.1 -0.032 -0.137 8.212 -2.889 10.891% 13.778% 0.039 0.213 0.044 16.244% 
2 3,741.7 0.019 9.226 5.473 -3.412 10.839% 13.845% 0.044 0.233 0.050 15.513% 
3 4,568.0 0.063 11.082 6.740 -3.580 11.003% 11.638% 0.036 0.213 0.048 14.703% 
4 6,687.2 0.148 22.896 8.725 -6.893 11.048% 9.320% 0.026 0.196 0.045 13.343% 
5-High 5,734.7 0.489 28.525 9.040 -9.573 10.906% 6.697% 0.022 0.175 0.039 12.017% 
High-Low 1,520.6 0.521*** 28.662*** -0.828 -6.684 0.015% -7.081%*** -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.005** -4.227%*** 
 
Panel B ETF Flows, V/P, and Relative Growth  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ETF Rank Book-to-
price 








1-Low 0.642 0.079 0.804 4.547% 1.434 0.788 5.465% 1.425 
2 0.620 0.078 0.769 5.536% 1.347 0.714 5.337% 1.332 
3 0.568 0.070 0.726 5.605% 1.303 0.788 5.268% 1.399 
4 0.578 0.068 0.715 6.097% 1.280 0.761 5.718% 1.251 
5-High 0.557 0.064 0.660 6.821% 1.253 0.713 5.967% 1.398 





Table 3 ETF Flows and the Price-to-Fundamentals Relation: Regression Analyses 
This table reports the results from estimating the following regressions: (
𝑉
𝑃
)𝑖,𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . Monthly stock-level ETF flows are calculated as the weighted 
average of the flows for all ETFs holding the stock, where the weight is the stock’s portfolio weight in each ETF. 
Annual ETF flows are calculated by adding up monthly stock-level ETF flows for 12 months from 3 months after the 
previous fiscal year-end, scaled by the total dollar trading volume during the year. I standardize the V/P, relative 
growth, and ETF flows by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year 
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES V/P V/P Relative Growth Relative Growth 
          
ETF Flow -0.099*** -0.082*** -0.060*** -0.050*** 
  (-7.18) (-5.57) (-5.86) (-4.88) 
Sales Growth   0.299***   0.090* 
    (7.48)   (2.03) 
Profit Margin   0.464***   0.425*** 
    (5.47)   (3.13) 
Asset Turnover   -0.004   0.003 
    (-1.36)   (0.83) 
Analyst LT Forecast   0.689***   0.076 
    (6.95)   (0.49) 
F_Score   0.050***   0.011* 
    (8.53)   (1.86) 
Beta_Market   -0.164***   0.049 
    (-3.46)   (0.64) 
Beta_HML   -0.266*   0.254 
    (-2.04)   (1.23) 
Beta_SMB   0.218*   -0.529*** 
    (1.76)   (-3.31) 
Beta_RMW   -0.014   0.050 
    (-0.10)   (0.18) 
Beta_CMA   -0.214   -0.190 
    (-1.41)   (-0.91) 
Size (t-1)   -0.313***   -0.001 
    (-10.53)   (-0.05) 
Book-to-Price (t-1)   -0.272***   -0.272*** 
    (-4.20)   (-3.99) 
Ret(-3,-1)   0.053   0.049 
    (1.47)   (1.48) 




    (-0.20)   (0.25) 
Ret(-9,-7)   -0.014   0.024 
    (-0.49)   (0.78) 
Ret(-12,-10)   0.010   0.052* 
    (0.34)   (1.76) 
V/P (t-1)   0.076*     
    (2.06)     
Relative Growth (t-
1)       0.065*** 
        (3.05) 
          
Observations 27,327 27,327 24,795 24,795 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 























Table 4 Cases with Negative V/P or Growth Higher than the Discount Rate  
This table reports the analyses for observations with either negative V/P or the implied growth rate higher than the 
discount rate. Monthly stock-level ETF flows are calculated as the weighted average of the flows for all ETFs holding 
the stock, where the weight is the stock’s portfolio weight in each ETF. Annual ETF flows are calculated by adding 
up monthly stock-level ETF flows for 12 months from 3 months after the previous fiscal year-end, scaled by the total 
dollar trading volume during the year. In Panel A, firms are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of the annual ETF 
flows, and the time-series averages of the value of speculative growth for each portfolio are reported. Panel B reports 
the results from estimating the following regression: 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. I standardize the value of speculative growth and ETF flows by subtracting the sample 
mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
double clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A ETF Flows and Speculative Growth: Portfolio Analysis 
  (1) (2) 
ETF Rank Full Sample Omitted Sample 
1-Low 0.242 0.490 
2 0.274 0.494 
3 0.317 0.517 
4 0.330 0.575 
5-High 0.417 0.636 
















Panel B ETF Flows and Speculative Growth: Regression Analyses 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Omitted Sample 
      
ETF Flow 0.046*** 0.033*** 
  (5.09) (3.60) 
Sales Growth -0.036 -0.088** 
  (-1.12) (-2.34) 
Profit Margin -0.242*** -0.271*** 
  (-4.10) (-4.24) 
Asset Turnover 0.000 0.001 
  (0.20) (0.35) 
Analyst LT Forecast -0.418*** -0.203** 
  (-7.16) (-2.53) 
F_Score -0.030*** -0.018*** 
  (-8.44) (-4.09) 
Beta_Market 0.084** 0.015 
  (2.16) (0.48) 
Beta_HML 0.096 0.028 
  (1.14) (0.89) 
Beta_SMB -0.070 -0.015 
  (-0.87) (-0.38) 
Beta_RMW -0.038 0.011 
  (-0.71) (0.42) 
Beta_CMA 0.133* 0.018 
  (1.78) (0.64) 
Size (t-1) 0.202*** -0.034 
  (12.39) (-1.56) 
Book-to-Price (t-1) 0.153*** -0.108 
  (4.30) (-1.51) 
Ret(-3,-1) -0.036 -0.103** 
  (-0.95) (-2.69) 
Ret(-6,-4) 0.064 -0.169*** 
  (0.54) (-4.49) 
Ret(-9,-7) -0.014 -0.031 
  (-0.29) (-1.14) 
Ret(-12,-10) 0.025 -0.019 
  (1.13) (-0.77) 
Speculative Growth(t-1) 0.410*** 0.112*** 
  (9.27) (3.95) 
      
Observations 29,590 5,865 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year 







Table 5 BlackRock’s Expansion into the ETF Business 
This table reports the results for BlackRock’s expansion into the ETF business setting.  Column (1) and column (2) 
report the results from estimating the following regression: 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +
𝑏2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑇𝐹% 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  , where TREAT equals 1 if the percentage of ownership by iShares 
is above the sample median before the event, and equals 0 for other stocks. POST equals 1 for 2010, and 0 for 2009. 
Column (3) and column (4) report the results from estimating the following regression:(
𝑉
𝑃
)𝑖,𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑇𝐹% 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 I standardize V/P, relative growth, and ETF 
flows by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ETF Flow ETF Flow V/P Relative Growth 
          
TREAT*POST 0.281*** 0.197*** -0.049** -0.024* 
  (4.34) (4.21) (-2.40) (-1.91) 
Sales Growth   -0.002 0.018** -0.005 
    (-0.93) (2.35) (-0.57) 
Profit Margin   -0.122 0.372*** 0.118* 
    (-1.33) (3.31) (1.84) 
Asset Turnover   -0.009 0.000 0.000 
    (-1.19) (0.09) (0.21) 
Analyst LT Forecast   0.141 -0.350** 0.051** 
    (0.55) (-2.40) (2.02) 
F_Score   -0.021* 0.000 0.002 
    (-1.85) (0.08) (0.84) 
Beta_Market   -0.372*** 0.120 -0.045 
    (-4.96) (1.00) (-1.57) 
Beta_HML   -0.259*** -0.009 0.026 
    (-5.45) (-0.13) (1.04) 
Beta_SMB   -0.072 -0.030 -0.018 
    (-1.38) (-0.40) (-0.47) 
Beta_RMW   -0.088*** -0.019 0.034* 
    (-2.61) (-0.51) (1.65) 
Beta_CMA   -0.103*** -0.010 0.012 
    (-4.17) (-0.21) (0.96) 
Size (t-1)   0.071 -0.022 0.001 
    (1.51) (-0.56) (0.37) 
Book-to-Price (t-1)   0.033 -0.070 0.004 
    (1.50) (-1.57) (1.14) 
Ret(-3,-1)   0.110 0.086 0.014 
    (1.40) (0.92) (1.02) 
Ret(-6,-4)   0.614*** 0.097 -0.018 




Ret(-9,-7)   -0.179* -0.349*** -0.022 
    (-1.73) (-2.68) (-1.14) 
Ret(-12,-10)   0.141 -0.160 0.005 
    (1.65) (-1.59) (0.43) 
V/P (t-1)   -0.011 0.034   
    (-0.53) (0.57)   
Relative Growth (t-1)   -0.000   0.013 
    (-0.45)   (1.36) 
Other ETF%   -12.996*** 3.008 -0.371 
    (-2.83) (1.42) (-1.41) 
          
Observations 3,974 3,974 3,755 3,470 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 
Adj. R-squared 0.519 0.594 0.906 0.356 






















Table 6 ETF Flows and Future Firm Performance  
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression equation: 
𝑅𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 is return on net operating assets in the subsequent year, which is calculated as operating income 
divided by net operating assets. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 is the sales growth rate in the subsequent year.    𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1 is one 
of the following variables in the subsequent year: 1) CAPEX scaled by beginning-year total assets 2) R&D scaled by 
beginning-year total assets 3) SG&A scaled by beginning-year total assets. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 is the buy-and-hold stock 
return in the subsequent year. I standardize RNOA, sales growth, investments, and ETF flows by subtracting the 
sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation in the entire sample. Firm and year fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RNOA(t+1) Sales Growth(t+1) CAPEX(t+1) R&D(t+1) SG&A(t+1) Return(t+1) 
       
ETF Flow -0.012* -0.006** 0.007 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.037*** 
 (-1.78) (-2.69) (0.72) (-0.67) (-3.44) (-3.70) 
Sales Growth 0.075 -0.035 0.066* -0.015 -0.020 -0.198*** 
 (1.66) (-1.33) (1.90) (-0.64) (-1.50) (-3.35) 
Profit Margin 0.135** -0.296* 0.079* -0.079** -0.037 0.176*** 
 (2.30) (-1.84) (2.02) (-2.23) (-1.55) (3.38) 
Asset Turnover 0.017** 0.001 0.006** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 
 (2.57) (1.01) (2.94) (0.64) (3.42) (0.35) 
Analyst LT 
Forecast 0.197* 0.056*** 0.361*** 0.073 0.142** -0.156 
 (2.08) (3.19) (3.77) (1.16) (2.66) (-0.84) 
F_Score 0.028*** 0.006 0.015** 0.003 0.018*** 0.029*** 
 (7.41) (0.89) (2.60) (1.43) (7.04) (3.82) 
Beta_Market 0.053 -0.030 -0.157** 0.001 0.035 -0.208 
 (1.46) (-1.07) (-2.29) (0.04) (1.51) (-1.56) 
Beta_HML -0.013 -0.023 -0.094 -0.025** -0.034** 0.042 
 (-0.56) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-2.16) (-2.25) (0.53) 
Beta_SMB 0.005 0.062 0.053 -0.003 -0.002 0.137 
 (0.11) (1.22) (0.60) (-0.11) (-0.07) (1.09) 
Beta_RMW 0.026 -0.016 0.065 0.068*** 0.046** -0.080 
 (1.32) (-1.36) (1.22) (3.89) (2.83) (-1.01) 
Beta_CMA 0.017 0.024* -0.037 -0.022 -0.018 0.041 
 (0.91) (1.86) (-0.57) (-1.46) (-1.01) (0.49) 
Size (t-1) -0.005 0.005 0.058*** -0.099*** -0.166*** -0.051* 
 (-0.18) (0.33) (3.36) (-6.38) (-10.44) (-1.77) 
Book-to-Price 
(t-1) -0.179*** -0.071** -0.037** -0.042*** -0.067*** 0.173*** 
 (-5.76) (-2.50) (-2.15) (-3.31) (-5.00) (2.65) 
Ret(-3,-1) 0.225*** 0.057 -0.012 0.011 0.054*** -0.329*** 
 (6.54) (1.41) (-0.38) (0.68) (3.39) (-5.11) 




 (5.08) (0.03) (3.99) (4.36) (4.51) (-5.20) 
Ret(-9,-7) 0.004 0.063*** 0.221*** -0.019 -0.006 0.080 
 (0.22) (4.26) (4.60) (-0.81) (-0.45) (1.47) 
Ret(-12,-10) 0.025 0.038** 0.252*** 0.008 -0.022 -0.041 
 (1.13) (2.57) (5.28) (0.36) (-1.32) (-0.79) 
       
Observations 29,131 29,131 29,131 29,131 29,131 29,131 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 


























Table 7 ETF Flows and Investors’ Attention 
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression equation: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡. I use the two variables to proxy for attention: (1) #Questions is the 
total number of questions being asked at conference calls during the year (2) Question Length is the total number of 
the words in questions being asked at conference calls during the year. I standardize #Questions, Question Length, 
and ETF flows by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES #Questions Question Length 
      
ETF Flow -0.050** -0.042* 
  (-2.16) (-1.87) 
Sales Growth 0.017 -0.004 
  (0.49) (-0.51) 
Profit Margin 0.288*** -0.040 
  (3.01) (-0.55) 
Asset Turnover -0.003 0.005 
  (-0.45) (0.81) 
Analyst LT Forecast 1.711*** 0.143 
  (3.45) (1.00) 
F_Score -0.027*** -0.008** 
  (-3.07) (-2.29) 
Beta_Market -0.521** -0.015 
  (-2.16) (-0.22) 
Beta_HML 0.274** -0.015 
  (2.89) (-0.50) 
Beta_SMB 0.086 0.060 
  (0.46) (1.22) 
Beta_RMW 0.224** -0.003 
  (2.55) (-0.12) 
Beta_CMA 0.057 -0.012 
  (0.56) (-0.32) 
Size (t-1) -0.321*** 0.155*** 
  (-4.58) (4.57) 
Book-to-Price (t-1) -0.226** -0.043** 
  (-2.57) (-2.28) 
Ret(-3,-1) -0.108 -0.004 
  (-1.15) (-0.08) 
Ret(-6,-4) -0.336** -0.104* 
  (-2.35) (-2.00) 
Ret(-9,-7) -0.229** -0.002 
  (-2.57) (-0.06) 
Ret(-12,-10) -0.418** 0.028 
  (-2.13) (0.58) 
      
Observations 11,958 11,958 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year 






Table 8 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Table 8 reports the results for cross-sectional analyses. Columns (1) and (2) compare stocks with more and fewer shareholders. Columns (3) and (4) compare stocks 
with high and low ownership by active investors. Columns (5) and (6) compare stocks with high and low idiosyncratic volatility. Column (7) and column (8) 
compare stocks with high and low ownership by lendable ETFs.  The breakpoints are based on the sample median. I standardize V/P, relative growth, and ETF 
flows by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are double clustered 
at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  Few SH=1 if the number of 
shareholders is below median 
Low Active =1 if ownership by 
active investors is below 
median 
High IVOL=1 if 
idiosyncratic return volatility 
is above median 
Low Lend=1 if ownership 
by lendable ETFs is 
below median 













                  
ETF Flow*Few SH -0.046** -0.015*             
  (-2.55) (-1.72)             
ETF Flow*Low Active     -0.048*** -0.021*         
      (-3.04) (-1.69)         
ETF Flow*High IVOL         -0.034** -0.023**     
          (-2.41) (-2.33)     
ETF Flow*Low Lend             -0.023** -0.025** 
              (-2.11) (-2.43) 
Few SH 0.008 -0.027             
  (0.14) (-1.44)             
Low Active     -0.011 -0.026*         
      (-0.99) (-1.73)         
High IVOL         -0.067*** -0.001     
          (-2.67) (-0.03)     
Low Lend             -0.043 -0.067*** 
              (-1.63) (-3.87) 
ETF Flow -0.032** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.049*** -0.067*** -0.048*** 
  (-2.27) (-3.60) (-3.70) (-3.07) (-3.61) (-3.23) (-3.77) (-3.66) 
                  
Observations 25,418 23,534 27,327 24,795 26,213 24,065 27,327 24,795 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 




Table 9 ETF Flows and Firm Share Issuances and Disclosures 
This table reports the results for firm behavior in response to ETF flows. Panel A reports the results from estimating 
the following regressions: 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1  equals one if the firm has an SEO during the subsequent year, and zero 
otherwise. 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 equals the total amount for share repurchases after removing the effect of 
share issuances and  the potential effect of repurchases for exercised stock options, scaled by beginning-year total 
assets. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1is the ratio of shares sold by all insiders to the sum of shares sold and purchased by all 
insiders during the subsequent year.  Panel B reports the results from estimating the following 
regression: #𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 +
𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .  #𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 is the number of long-horizon management earnings forecasts during the subsequent year. 
#𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 and #𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 are the numbers of long-horizon, walk-up and walk-down earnings forecasts 
issued during subsequent year, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are double 
clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A ETF Flows, Share Issuances, Repurchases, and Insider Sales 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SEO(t+1) Adjusted Repurchases (t+1)  
Insider 
Sales(t+1) 
        
ETF Flow 0.005* -0.029* 0.034*** 
  (1.85) (-1.89) (2.99) 
Sales Growth -0.000 -0.026 0.002** 
  (-0.30) (-1.10) (2.27) 
Profit Margin -0.030** 0.256** 0.043 
  (-2.71) (2.47) (0.93) 
Asset Turnover -0.001 0.019** 0.000 
  (-1.09) (2.21) (0.05) 
Analyst LT Forecast -0.022 -0.592* 0.006 
  (-0.70) (-2.10) (0.05) 
F_Score -0.000 0.061*** 0.006 
  (-0.22) (7.26) (0.94) 
Beta_Market 0.012 -0.086 0.113 
  (0.78) (-0.85) (1.74) 
Beta_HML 0.008 0.041 0.109*** 
  (1.24) (0.77) (3.27) 
Beta_SMB -0.003 0.427*** 0.107* 
  (-0.16) (3.56) (1.88) 
Beta_RMW 0.000 0.033 -0.030 
  (0.02) (0.47) (-0.80) 
Beta_CMA -0.006 0.303** -0.004 
  (-0.97) (2.56) (-0.17) 
Size (t-1) -0.024*** 0.361*** 0.074*** 
  (-4.58) (9.95) (5.99) 




  (-1.76) (2.35) (-4.41) 
Ret(-3,-1) 0.018** -0.005 0.174*** 
  (2.47) (-0.10) (4.57) 
Ret(-6,-4) 0.020** -0.095* 0.238*** 
  (2.32) (-1.84) (7.46) 
Ret(-9,-7) 0.006 0.098* 0.237*** 
  (0.77) (1.89) (5.24) 
Ret(-12,-10) -0.011 0.179** 0.148*** 
  (-1.36) (2.68) (6.71) 
        
Observations 29,590 25,704 29,590 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 
























Panel B ETF Flows and Firm Disclosures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES #Guidance(t+1) #Walkup(t+1) #Walkdown(t+1) 
        
ETF Flow -0.012*** -0.013* -0.007 
  (-2.59) (-1.84) (-0.97) 
Sales Growth -0.000 -0.009 0.007 
  (-1.13) (-0.68) (0.64) 
Profit Margin 0.107*** 0.028 0.276*** 
  (3.94) (0.45) (4.04) 
Asset Turnover 0.003 0.001 0.003 
  (1.15) (0.17) (1.04) 
Analyst LT Forecast 0.293*** 0.091 0.494*** 
  (3.16) (0.57) (2.99) 
F_Score 0.012*** 0.014 0.008 
  (2.70) (1.62) (1.28) 
Beta_Market 0.021 0.106 0.135* 
  (0.56) (1.24) (1.77) 
Beta_HML 0.014 -0.027 -0.006 
  (0.52) (-0.41) (-0.14) 
Beta_SMB -0.077* -0.116* -0.057 
  (-1.90) (-1.87) (-0.88) 
Beta_RMW -0.021 0.070 -0.129*** 
  (-0.85) (1.43) (-3.08) 
Beta_CMA 0.002 -0.005 -0.016 
  (0.13) (-0.13) (-0.67) 
Size (t-1) 0.059*** -0.022 0.098*** 
  (4.15) (-1.01) (5.24) 
Book-to-Price (t-1) 0.005 -0.032 -0.007 
  (0.47) (-0.76) (-0.59) 
Ret(-3,-1) 0.069*** 0.110*** 0.074** 
  (3.92) (3.96) (2.56) 
Ret(-6,-4) 0.094** -0.127** 0.223*** 
  (2.05) (-2.23) (5.20) 
Ret(-9,-7) 0.100*** 0.082* 0.104*** 
  (4.77) (2.01) (3.27) 
Ret(-12,-10) 0.055** -0.027 0.131*** 
  (2.31) (-0.70) (3.94) 
        
Observations 29,590 29,590 29,590 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year Firm&Year 





Table 10 Cross-section of Stock Returns 
Table 10 reports the results for the cross-sectional return analysis. At the beginning of every calendar month, stocks 
are ranked in ascending order based on the last available 12-month ETF flows. The time-series averages of the 
weighted-average portfolio raw returns are reported in column (1) and Fama-French five-factor alphas are reported in 
column (2). Also reported are the zero-cost portfolio returns buying the top 20% stocks and selling short the bottom 
20% stocks. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ETF Flow Rank Raw Return Fama French 5-factor Alpha 
1-Low 1.392% 0.408% 
2 1.275% 0.130% 
3 1.297% 0.296% 
4 0.927% -0.140% 
5-High 0.643% -0.301% 




















Table 11 Mutual Fund Flows 
This table reports the results from estimating the following regressions: (
𝑉
𝑃
)𝑖,𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑀𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑀𝐹 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . Non-index and 
index mutual fund flows at the fund level are calculated as: 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗, 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑡). I standardize the V/P, 
relative growth, ETF flows, non-index mutual fund flows, and index mutual fund flows by subtracting the sample 
mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
double clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES V/P Relative Growth 
   
ETF Flow -0.072*** -0.049*** 
 (-4.78) (-4.54) 
Non-index MF Flow 0.005 0.009 
 (0.85) (1.08) 
Index MF Flow -0.014* -0.016* 
 (-1.89) (-1.80) 
   
Observations 27,327 24,795 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm&Year Firm&Year 
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Appendix 1: Examples of critics on ETFs from Practitioners: 
 
1.  “... as ETFs attract capital, they have to buy large amounts of these stocks, further fueling their rise… 
Is Apple a safe stock or a stock that has performed well of late?  Is anyone thinking about the 
difference?” 
 
“Yes. They are great companies. But the ETFs probably have accentuated the flow of capital into those 
stocks. Nothing works forever. Things that are most hyped and usually the things that are most loved 
produce the most disappointment and the most pain.” 
 
– Howard Marks, Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of Oaktree Capital Management 
 
2. “The weapons of mass destruction during the Great Financial Crisis were three-letter words: CDS 
(credit default swap), CDO (collateralized debt obligation), etc. The current weapon of mass 
destruction is also a three-letter word: ETF (exchange-traded fund). When the world decides that there 
is no need for fundamental research and investors can just blindly purchase index funds and ETFs 
without any regard to valuation, we say the time to be fearful is now.”  
 
– FPA Capital Fund, Inc. in Letters to Shareholders 
 
3. “ETFs occasionally swing to illogical extremes when popularity leads to overpriced and overweighted 
constituents.” 
 
– Bruce Berkowitz, Founder of Fairholme Capital Management 
 
4. “So what's been going on for almost a decade now is a constant flow of money out of actively managed 
securities which have acted in essence as the bank to fund inflows, into equity ETFs ... that is what 
forms the foundation of the bubble activity we have today.” 
 
– Steven Bregman, Co-Founder of Horizon Kinetics LLC 
 
5. “Passive investing is the bubble right now, and that's a great danger.” 
 
“But in the market today, the danger is that you have all this money pouring in America into ETFs and 
ETFs are sort of almost blind buying. You just buy these ETFs and I always question the fact that if 
you’re buying these stocks and you really don’t know what you own, you’re prone to these periods of 
time – there could be some kind of crisis and there could be a problem.” 
 
– Carl Icahn, Chairman of Icahn Enterprises, advising U.S. President Donald Trump on Financial 
Regulation 
 
6. “The inherent irony of the efficient market theory is that the more people believe in it and 
correspondingly shun active management, the more inefficient the market is likely to become.” 
 







Source:   
 
1. There They Go Again… Again:  Memos from Howard Marks  (2017): 
https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-source/memos/there-they-go-again-again.pdfs  
 
Howard Marks Blames ETFs for Overpriced FANG Stocks (Yahoo! Finance 2018):  
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/howard-marks-blames-etfs-overpriced-165248183.html 
 




3. Bruce Berkowitz – ETF’s Occasionally Swing To Illogical Extremes (ValueWalk 2017):   
https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/05/bruce-berkowitz-etfs/ 
 
4. Steven Bregman: America’s Hottest Investment Product has Created “the Greatest Bubble Ever” 
(Business Insider 2017): https://www.businessinsider.com/steven-bregman-etfs-passive-investing-
greatest-bubble-ever-2017-6 
 
5. “These Are the Rumblings.” Carl Icahn Warns the Stock Market Will Implode (Fortune 2018): 
http://fortune.com/2018/02/06/carl-icahn-stock-market-warnings/ 
 






















Appendix 2: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Name Description 
Main Variables 
ETF flows ETF Flow • Annual stock-level ETF flows, which are 
accumulated for 12 months from 3 months after 
the last fiscal year-end to 3 months after the 
current fiscal year-end, scaled by the dollar 
trading volume during the year. 
• The monthly ETF flows are calculated as the 
weighted average of the flows for all ETFs 
holding the stock, where the weight is the stock 
i’s portfolio weight in each ETF.  
• The data are from ETF.com, CRSP, and 




V/P • The Value-to-Price ratio, which is the ratio of 
the “intrinsic value” (V) to the market price (P). 
• V is a forward-looking measure of fundamental 
value derived from the residual income model, 
and the price is the price at the end of 3 months 
after the fiscal year-end.   




Relative Growth • The ratio of 1 plus the growth rate implied by 
fundamentals to 1 plus growth rate implied by 
the stock price. 
• The fundamental residual income growth rate is 
calculated as the growth rate impeded in analyst 
forecasts. 
• The implied firm’s long-run growth rate is 
calculated from the stock price by reverse 
engineering the growth rate from the residual 
income valuation model. 







• The difference between the price and the value 
based on the no-growth assumption, scaled by 
the price. 





Control Variables  
Sales growth rate Sales Growth • Changes in sales, scaled by sales from last 
fiscal year. 
• The data are from Compustat. 
Operating Profit 
margin 
Profit Margin • The ratio of operating income to sales. 
• Operating income is calculated as earnings (net 
income - preferred dividends + change in 
marketable securities adjustment + change in 
cumulative translation adjustment) plus net 
interest expense (after-tax interest expense + 
preferred dividends – after-tax interest income 
+ minority interest in income – change in 
marketable securities adjustment). 
• The data are from Compustat. 
Asset turnover Asset Turnover • The ratio of sales to net operating assets (NOA) 
• NOA is the sum of accounts receivable (item 
RECT), inventory (item INVT), other current 
assets (item ACO), property, plant, and 
equipment (item PPENB), intangible assets 
(item INTAN) and other long-term assets (item 
AO), minus the sum of accounts payables (item 
AP), other current liabilities (item LCO) and 
other long term liabilities (item LO). 






• The median of analyst long-term growth 
forecasts made 3 months after the fiscal year-
end.  
• The data are from I/B/E/S. 
F Score F_Score • The sum of the nine binary signals, and is 
designed to measure the overall improvement, 
or deterioration, in firms’ financial conditions, 
as developed by Piotroski (2000). 
• The data are obtained from Compustat. 
Market beta and 







• The regression coefficients from regressing 
excess daily returns for a firm on excess market 
returns over the period 3 months after the 
previous fiscal year-end to 3 months after the 
current fiscal year-end. 
• The market return and risk-free rate are 
obtained from Ken French’s website. 
• The return data are from CRSP. 
Firm size Size • Market capitalization of the firm measured 3 




• The market capitalization equals the share price 
× the number of shares outstanding as reported 
by Compustat. 
• I use the natural log of firm size in all the 
regressions.  
Book-to-price  Book-to-Price • Ratio of book value of equity to the price, both 
measured at 3 months after the last fiscal year-
end, from Compustat and CRSP. 
Stock Return 
during 1 quarter, 
2 quarter, 3 








• Buy-and-hold returns 1 quarter, 2 quarter, 3 
quarter, and 4 quarter before ETF flows are 
calculated. 
• The return data are from CRSP. 
 
Return on net 
operating assets 
RNOA • A measure of the operating profitability of the 
firm, as measured by operating income scaled 
by NOA.  
• The data are from Compustat. 
Forward returns Return (t+1) • Annual buy-and-hold returns beginning three 
months after the fiscal year-end, calculated 
from CRSP as compounded monthly returns. 
• The data are from CRSP. 
R&D expense R&D • R&D expenditures scaled by beginning-year 
total assets, set to zero if missing. 
• The data are from Compustat. 
SG&A expense SG&A • Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses 
scaled by beginning-year total assets, set to zero 
if missing. 
• The data are from Compustat. 
Capital 
expenditure 
CAPEX • Capital expenditures scaled by beginning-year 
total assets, set to zero if missing. 
• The data are from Compustat. 
Firms with low 
active investor 
activity 
Low Active% • Equals 1 if ownership by active investors is 
below the median at the beginning of the year. 
• Active investors are non-index mutual funds 
with at least 60% active shares as calculated by 
Cremers and Petajusto (2009). 
• The data are from Martijn Cremers website: 
https://activeshare.nd.edu/data/. 
Firms with a less 
competitive 
market 
Few Shareholders • Equals 1 if the number of shareholders is below 
the median at the beginning of the year. 




Firms less likely 
to have close 
substitutes 
High IVOL • Equals 1 if the idiosyncratic return volatility is 
above the median, and idiosyncratic return 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation 
of residuals from a market model (with value 
weighted CRSP index) that uses 252 daily 
returns during the last year. 
• The data are from CRSP. 
Firms with fewer 
shares owned by 
lendable ETFs 
Low Lend% • Equals 1 if ownership by lendable ETFs is 
below the median. 
• A lendable ETF is one that lend out shares. 
• The data are from Bloomberg.  
Secondary equity 
offering issuance 
SEO • Equals one if the firm has an SEO during 
subsequent year, and zero otherwise. 






• Equals the total amount for share repurchases 
after removing the effect of share issuances and 
the effect of repurchases for exercised options, 
scaled by beginning-year total assets (Ferri and 
Li 2018). 
• The data are from Compustat. 
Insider sales Insider sales • The ratio of shares sold to the sum of shares 
sold and purchased by all insiders during the 
subsequent year. 




#Guidance • The number of long-horizon management 
earnings forecasts during the subsequent year. 
• A long-horizon forecast is one made prior to 90 
days before the forecast period end date. 




#WalkUp • The number of long-horizon and walk-up 
earnings forecasts during the subsequent year. 
• A walk-up forecast is one that are higher than 
the consensus estimate. 




#WalkDown • The number of long-horizon and walk-down 
earnings forecasts during the subsequent year. 
• A walk-down forecast is one that are lower than 
the consensus estimate. 
• The data are from I/B/E/S Guidance database. 
Investor 
Attention   
#Question 
Question Length 
• #Questions is the total number of questions 




• Question Length is the total number of the 
words in questions being asked at conference 
calls during the year. 
• I obtain conference call transcripts from the 






Index MF Flow 
•  Annual stock-level non-index and index 
mutual fund flows, which are accumulated for 
12 months from 3 months after the last fiscal 
year-end, scaled by the dollar trading volume 
during the year. 
• The monthly mutual fund flows are calculated 
as the weighted average of the flows for all 
non-index and index mutual funds holding the 
stock, respectively, where the weight is the 
stock i’s portfolio weight in each mutual fund. 
Mutual fund flows at the fund level are 
calculated as: 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗, 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 × (1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑡).  
• I identify a fund as an index fund if its fund name 
includes a string that identifies it as an index 
fund or if the CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
classifies the fund as an index fund. Specifically, 
I use the same strings as in Appel et al. (2016) to 
identify index funds. These strings include: 
Index, Idx, Indx, Ind_(where_ indicates a space), 
Russell, S & P, S and P, SandP, SP, DOW, Dow, 
DJ, MSCI, Bloomberg, KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, 
STOXX, FTSE, Wilshire, Morningstar, 100, 400, 
500, 600, 900, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 5000. 
• The data are from CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database. 
 
